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dc.date.accessioned2018-07-27T16:05:50Z
dc.date.available2018-07-27T16:05:50Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifierET2553
dc.identifier.citation(2016) The fairer sex? An ultimatum game experiment investigating gender-specific negotiating behaviour, no. 93.
dc.identifier.urihttps://eresearch.qmu.ac.uk/handle/20.500.12289/7797
dc.description.abstractSome authors believe that differences in negotiating behaviour between males and females account for, at least to some degree, the Gender Pay Gap (see Kennedy and Kray 2015; Dittrich et al. 2014; Roche 2014; Leibbrandt and List 2012). Therefore, the author of this dissertation believes that further research into gender-specific negotiating differences is justified as the Gender Pay Gap in the UK sits at 19.2% when the full workforce is taken into account (ONS 2016), and is a considerable hindrance to gender equality. This dissertation aims to investigate the effect of opponent gender on both offerer and responder behaviour in negotiations, and how each sex behaves when negotiating with a female, in an attempt to add findings to the pool of studies which so far tend to disagree on female negotiating behaviour. The current research was executed by creating, and carrying out, an online Ultimatum Game simulation which recorded participants' behaviour when opposing different genders, with participants playing both the role of 'offerer' and 'responder'. Data was collated and analysed, with comparisons drawn between the means of each gender pairing. One of the main findings was that gender alone does appear to affect both male and female behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. It was also found that both genders offer more to females with females offering the largest amounts of all, and that men were more likely to reject an offer.
dc.format.extent93
dc.publisherQueen Margaret University
dc.titleThe fairer sex? An ultimatum game experiment investigating gender-specific negotiating behaviour
dc.typeThesis
dcterms.accessRightsrestricted
dc.description.facultyba_busman
dc.description.ispublishedunpub
dc.description.eprintid2553_etheses
rioxxterms.typeThesis
dc.description.statusunpub


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