Browsing by Person "Oliveira Cruz, V."

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Global Health Initiatives and aid effectiveness: insights from a Ugandan case study
(BioMed Central, 2011-07-04) Oliveira Cruz, V.; McPake, Barbara
Background The emergence of Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) has been a major feature of the aid environment of the last decade. This paper seeks to examine in depth the behaviour of two prominent GHIs in the early stages of their operation in Uganda as well as the responses of the government. Methods The study adopted a qualitative and case study approach to investigate the governance of aid transactions in Uganda. Data sources included documentary review, in-depth and semi-structured interviews and observation of meetings. Agency theory guided the conceptual framework of the study. Results The Ugandan government had a stated preference for donor funding to be channelled through the general or sectoral budgets. Despite this preference, two large GHIs opted to allocate resources and deliver activities through projects with a disease-specific approach. The mixed motives of contributor country governments, recipient country governments and GHI executives produced incentive regimes in conflict between different aid mechanisms. Conclusion Notwithstanding attempts to align and harmonize donor activities, the interests and motives of the various actors (GHIs and different parts of the government) undermine such efforts
The aid contract and its compensation scheme: A case study of the performance of the Ugandan health sector
(Elsevier, 2010-10) Oliveira Cruz, V.; McPake, Barbara
Current literature on aid effectiveness describes increasing use of a more contractual approach to the relationship between donor and recipient government in which a system of rewards and penalties for good and bad performance operates. The purpose of this case study of the Ugandan health sector was to understand the extent to which this approach is influencing processes and effectiveness. This qualitative study used a conceptual framework based on agency theory and 'realistic evaluation'. Our results showed that the main official mechanism to assess and reward performance established through the Sector Wide Approach lacked objective criteria and was based on an unstructured system of discussions and agreements among donors. The achievement of a satisfactory performance rating was facilitated by the agreeing to undertakings that were under-demanding, vaguely formulated and lacking quantitative benchmarks against which progress could be measured. However, even when poor performance was readily observable, penalties failed to be applied by donors. This was always the case in relation to health sector performance and mostly so in relation to general governance and accountability. Funds continued to be disbursed despite the lack of progress made in achieving targets and undertakings and other evident performance problems (e.g. in the area of governance). A series of explanations of the failure to penalise were put forward by donor representatives in relation to this behaviour including the need to maintain long-term relationships based on trust and not to undermine health sector performance by withdrawing aid. Thus there are likely to be incentives to disburse funds and report success, irrespective of the realities of aid programmes in the context of large foreign aid volumes associated with increased political visibility of aid in donor countries. 2010 Elsevier Ltd.